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THE ALASKA HEALTH CARE 
DECISIONS ACT, ANALYZED 
KENNETH C. KIRK* 
This Article reviews and examines the Alaska Health Care 
Decisions Act (“AHCDA”), found at section 13.52 of the Alaska 
Statutes and effective January 1, 2005.  The AHCDA is examined 
functionally, historically, philosophically, and by hypothetical 
application to well-known cases.  The Article identifies a number 
of errors and ambiguities in the AHCDA and concludes that while 
the AHCDA expresses itself as an attempt to balance the societal 
concerns of sanctity of life and the right to self-determination, in 
practice it is likely to promote termination of life support in 
circumstances supported by neither of those two philosophical 
imperatives. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After four years of debate, the 2004 Alaska Legislature finally 
passed the Alaska Health Care Decisions Act (“AHCDA”).1  The 
AHCDA is an ambitious attempt to pull together a number of 
statutory schemes related to the end of life, including laws on 
advance directives (also known as “living wills”), termination of life 
support for those who are terminally ill or permanently 
unconscious, laws related to decision making for the mentally ill, 
and laws related to organ donation. The AHCDA also adds a 
section on surrogate decision making for those who have not filled 
out an advance medical directive and have no court-appointed 
guardian. The AHCDA includes an optional form called an 
advance healthcare directive, which can be used to appoint a 
decision maker for healthcare decisions in the event a person is 
incapacitated.2  The advance healthcare directive also provides 
instructions for healthcare, including decisions to withdraw life 
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 1. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52 (2004). 
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support (which includes feeding tubes); changes the system for 
making anatomical gifts at death; allows appointment of a 
surrogate decision maker for mental health treatment; and 
indicates the physician who will have the right, under certain 
circumstances, to make decisions on a patient’s behalf.3 
This Article will examine the AHCDA from several different 
perspectives.  Part II reviews the AHCDA functionally, with an 
emphasis on what its various parts achieve and how well these parts 
fit together.  Part III culls the legislative history to show how the 
bill evolved from a “Five Wishes” statement to its current form.  
Part IV examines the AHCDA from a philosophical perspective, 
showing how the various emphases on sanctity of life, right to self-
determination, and quality of life have been factored, albeit 
somewhat unevenly, into the Act.  Part V applies the AHCDA to 
the well-known cases involving Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy 
Cruzan, Terri Schiavo, Sun Hudson, and Ora Mae Magouirk to see 
how those cases would likely have come out under the AHCDA.  
Finally, Part VI considers the likely practical effects of the 
AHCDA, analyzing whether the probable results are in fact 
consistent with the aims on which the AHCDA purports to be 
based. 
II.  FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The Health Care Decisions Act is a hybrid enactment, 
covering a number of different areas relating to decision making on 
medical issues. 
The AHCDA’s most distinctive attribute is the new advance 
healthcare directive form, with the activating portion at the 
beginning of the statute,4 and the optional form itself at the 
conclusion (except for the definitions).5  Under the old living will 
statute,6 a terminally ill individual could direct that his attending 
physician withhold or withdraw procedures that merely prolonged 
the dying process and were not necessary to keep him comfortable 
and to relieve pain.7  The individual could also make an organ 
donation on the same document8 or separately.  Under the new 
form, in a single document, the individual can designate an agent to 
make healthcare decisions if he or she becomes incapacitated; can 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. § 13.52.010. 
 5. § 13.52.300. 
 6. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010–.100 (2002) (repealed 2004). 
 7. § 18.12.010(a) (repealed 2004). 
 8. § 13.50.030 (repealed 2004). 
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limit that agent’s authority; can indicate, when the person has a 
“qualifying condition,”9 whether life should be prolonged by 
artificial means, artificial nutrition or hydration, or whether pain 
relief should be provided; can direct an anatomical gift at death, 
and even what types of use to which the gift can be made; can 
delegate authority for mental health treatment; and can designate a 
primary physician for decision-making purposes.10  The AHCDA 
provides details regarding how the form must be witnessed, when it 
is effective,11 what the agent must consider in making decisions on 
the person’s behalf, and how it may be revoked, among other 
limitations. 
Noticeably, the statutes related to guardianship were not 
incorporated into the AHCDA, but were instead left in Title 13.12  
However, several portions of the AHCDA do relate to guardians.  
Under the guardianship statutes, a person nominated by the 
respondent has priority to be selected as guardian,13 and under the 
AHCDA the form may include the individual’s nomination of a 
guardian;14 thus, the AHCDA provides a method for nominating 
the person who will be given priority under the guardianship 
statutes.  The sample form, if left unaltered, simply nominates the 
person who is designated to make healthcare decisions as the 
guardian.15 Note, however, that under the guardianship statutes, a 
general guardian has a great deal of authority with regard to 
finances (assuming a separate conservator has not been appointed), 
and a different person might be better able to handle those duties.  
As a result, patients are advised to consider carefully the decision 
to designate a healthcare agent that will also act as the preferred 
guardian.  Separating the functions of healthcare agent and 
guardian would require writing a separate instruction on the form, 
as the appointment of a guardian is otherwise automatic in the last 
paragraph of Part One of the statutory form. 
Interestingly, absent a court order to the contrary, a healthcare 
decision made by an agent16 takes precedence over that of a 
 
 9. Defined as either a condition of permanent unconsciousness or a terminal 
condition.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300 (2004). 
 10. Id. 
 11. § 13.52.010(f).  The form is only effective during the time the principal 
lacks capacity.  Id. 
 12. §§ 13.26.090–.155. 
 13. § 13.26.145(d)(1). 
 14. § 13.52.010(j). 
 15. § 13.52.300 pt. 1(5). 
 16. An “agent” refers to one appointed under an advance healthcare directive. 
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guardian,17 and the guardian is required to comply with the ward’s 
healthcare directive unless a court expressly authorizes the 
revocation.  Attorneys who represent petitioners in guardianship 
cases have already noticed the potential malpractice trap; 
consequently, they now draft proposed orders for the court so that 
their guardians will be able to act according to their own 
perceptions of the ward’s best interest and will not be overruled by 
an appointed agent.  To understand the problem, imagine that you 
are the attorney for the petitioner in a guardianship case, and your 
client has asked you to secure guardianship over a relative with 
dementia, in part so that reasonable healthcare decisions can be 
made.  In your proposed orders, which are ultimately adopted by 
the court, you neglect to state clearly that the guardian’s decisions 
will overrule any decisions by an agent (probably because you are 
using the same forms you used in the past, when this was not an 
issue).  On the eve of an important medical procedure, you 
discover that the ward has a pre-existing, valid healthcare directive, 
naming another individual as the agent.  The agent will not consent 
to the medical procedure, so it cannot be performed.  The 
malpractice risk in that scenario should be apparent. 
In recognition of the fact that a significant portion of the 
population does not, and will not, have advance directives, the 
AHCDA includes a detailed provision allowing for the 
appointment of surrogates for individuals who do not have advance 
healthcare directives or guardians.18  A patient can designate such a 
surrogate by personally informing the supervising healthcare 
providers of the identity of the desired surrogate.19  If the patient 
fails to do so, a surrogate is appointed according to a priority list, 
beginning with the patient’s spouse, then adult children, then 
parents, then adult siblings, and finally “an adult who has exhibited 
special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the 
patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably available.”20  The 
surrogate is to act in accordance with the patient’s individual 
instructions and wishes; otherwise, the surrogate may make the 
decision in accordance with his or her determination of the 
patient’s best interest, considering the patient’s personal values.21  
The patient’s primary healthcare provider may overrule the 
 
 17. § 13.52.040(b). 
 18. § 13.52.030. 
 19. § 13.52.030(c). 
 20. § 13.52.030(d). 
 21. § 13.52.030(g). 
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surrogate’s decision if it appears that he or she is not abiding by the 
wishes, values, and best interests of the patient.22 
The AHCDA has specific restrictions on when life support 
(including the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration) 
may be withheld or withdrawn.  The patient must have a 
“qualifying condition,” which means either a terminal condition or 
a state of permanent unconsciousness.23  However, the standards 
for do-not-resuscitate orders (commonly called “DNR” or 
“Comfort One” orders) are different under the AHCDA.  
Specifically, the order must be entered by a physician and does not 
require the consent of the patient, agent, guardian, surrogate, or 
family.24 
The rules on anatomical gifts (also known as “organ 
donation”) primarily involve two different sections of the 
AHCDA.  The first, section 13.52.170, allows the patient to make 
an anatomical gift in a variety of ways.25  The second, section 
13.52.180, allows other individuals (again, according to a priority 
list) to make anatomical gifts on the patient’s behalf, unless the 
patient had previously and specifically objected.26  The statute also 
provides a form for a third party to make the gift,27 and other 
sections of the statute attempt to sort out the necessary details and 
prevent abuses.28 
Finally, there are the mental health provisions.29  Part Four of 
the optional form directive allows an individual to make a variety 
of decisions about mental health treatment, including whether he 
or she consents to administration of psychotropic medications, 
electroconvulsive treatment, or mental health commitment.30  The 
remaining mental health provisions, for the most part, carve out 
 
 22. § 13.52.030(h). 
 23. § 13.52.390(36). 
 24. § 13.52.065. 
 25. § 13.52.170. 
 26. § 13.52.180. 
 27. § 13.52.190. 
 28. §§ 13.52.200–.270. 
 29. Whether mental health treatment even falls within the AHCDA depends 
on whether the AHCDA is viewed as primarily related to medical care or to end-
of-life issues.  If the AHCDA is aimed at medical care in general, including mental 
health treatment, this part of the statute makes sense.  But, if one thinks of the 
AHCDA as related primarily to questions surrounding the end-of-life, the section 
on mental health treatment does not fit at all. 
 30. § 13.52.300, pt. 4. 
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exceptions to the general rules applicable to other medical 
treatments.31 
Most of the laws related to mental health commitments are not 
in the AHCDA, but rather in section 47.3032 of the Alaska Statutes, 
which covers involuntary mental health commitments.  Under the 
involuntary commitment statute, an individual can be committed 
by a peace officer, a psychiatrist or other physician, or a 
psychologist;33 the AHCDA adds the designated healthcare agent 
to the list of people who can initially order a commitment.34  
Additionally, under the AHCDA, the agent can commit the patient 
for up to seventeen days,35 whereas the statute on involuntary 
commitments mandates a probable cause hearing within three 
days.36 
The mental health portion of the advance directive itself is 
nothing new; indeed, it is lifted word-for-word from the old statute, 
which was titled “Personal Declaration of Preference for Mental 
Health Treatment”37 and was repealed effective the same day the 
AHCDA took effect.38  Both forms allow the agent to make the 
decisions on psychotropic medication, electroconvulsive treatment, 
and involuntary commitment for up to seventeen days.39 
Curiously, under Part Four of the AHCDA’s form, the default 
rule is that the healthcare agent can make mental health decisions 
on behalf of the patient.40  Consequently, there is a risk that those 
who do not read the form carefully or check off the boxes 
indicating non-consent will inadvertently give the agent the 
authority to consent to highly invasive and controversial mental 
 
 31. E.g., § 13.52.020(a)–(c) (outlining exceptions to the general rules regarding 
revocation of a directive); § 13.52.030 (relating to surrogates); § 13.52.120(f) 
(regarding commitments to mental health facilities). 
 32. §§ 47.30.700–.815. 
 33. § 47.30.705. 
 34. § 13.52.300. 
 35. Id. 
 36. § 47.30.715. 
 37. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.950–.980 (2002) (repealed 2004). 
 38. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300 (2004); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.950–.980  (2002) 
(repealed 2004). 
 39. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300 (2004); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.950–.980  (2002) 
(repealed 2004). 
 40. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300, pt. 4 (2004). The optional form directive reads 
as follows: “If you are satisfied to allow your agent to determine what is best for 
you in making these mental health decisions, you do not need to fill out this part 
of the form.”  Id. 
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health treatments.41  Under the repealed mental health declaration, 
there was no such default.42  Rather, a patient who did not wish to 
give an agent those powers did not have to fill out the form in the 
first place.43 
Moreover, the witnessing requirements were more stringent 
under the prior statute.  Under that statute, neither witness could 
be related to the patient,44 and the agent was expected to accept the 
appointment in writing.45  Under the AHCDA, one witness may be 
a relative of the patient’s.46 As a result, it is easier to delegate 
important mental health decisions, and such delegation can even be 
done accidentally by leaving Part Four of the statutory form blank. 
This puzzling default in the mental health section underscores 
a problem that surfaces throughout the AHCDA: people are 
encouraged to fill out these forms as part of estate planning or 
general good stewardship, even if they do not have current medical 
problems; however, many parts of the statutory form seem 
designed for those with an existing major medical issue. 
III.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
The AHCDA’s history is unusual in that it took a full four 
years of work in various committees in order for the bill to become 
law.  The bill was introduced in 2001, in the first session of the 22nd 
legislature, as House Bill 197.47  After the House Health, Education 
and Social Services (“HESS”) Committee and the Judiciary 
Committee made amendments, the bill passed the House during 
the second session of that legislature in 2002.48  It did not pass the 
Senate (it was never even scheduled for a Senate hearing), and so, 
technically speaking, it died.  However, in the following legislature, 
 
 41. Although some individuals with current psychological disorders may wish 
to give a trusted agent the authority to make these decisions on his or her behalf, it 
is unlikely that a person who has no current mental disorder would want to 
appoint someone to override his or her express wishes in this regard.  After all, 
mental health treatment is generally recommended only for conscious patients.  If 
the patient is conscious and agrees to the treatment, there is no need for the agent 
to be involved.  So, presumably if the agent is acting, it is because the patient is not 
in agreement, at the time the decision must be made, with the proposed treatment. 
 42. See ALASKA STAT.  §§ 47.30.950–.980 (2002) (repealed 2004). 
 43. Id. 
 44. § 47.30.954 (repealed 2004). 
 45.  § 47.30.970 (repealed 2004). 
 46. ALASKA STAT.  § 13.52.010(e) (2004). 
 47. H.B. 197, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001). 
 48. H.B. 197, 22d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2002). 
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the bill was reintroduced in exactly the same form.49  Finally, in 
2004, after being amended numerous times by both the House and 
Senate committees, the bill received near-unanimous legislative 
approval and became law.50 
From the beginning, the bill was touted as being based on the 
“Five Wishes.”51  The Five Wishes is a document developed by the 
Aging With Dignity organization,52 which prompts the declarant to 
make choices regarding the following: 
1. Comfort care (such as how much medicine should be 
provided, whether warm baths should be given, and 
whether religious readings or “well-loved poems” should 
be read aloud to the declarant when near death); 
2. How people should treat the declarant (such as whether 
people should be around when death is near, whether 
members of a church or synagogue should be asked to pray 
for the declarant, and whether there is a preference to die 
in the home); 
3. What loved ones should be told (including, for example, 
whether the declarant wishes forgiveness from family or 
friends, how the declarant wishes to be remembered, and 
instructions for memorial services); 
4. Desired medical treatment (including especially the 
question of withdrawal of life support); and, 
5. Which person should be named to make healthcare 
decisions if the declarant is no longer able to do so. 
 
 49.  Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 6 
(Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/ 
M/HHES2003-02-131507. pdf. 
 50. H.B. 25, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2004). 
 51. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 6 
(Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/ 
M/SHES2004-03-081333.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d 
Leg., 1st Sess. 11–13 (Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www. 
legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary 
Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess. 36–39 (Alaska Mar. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HJUD2002-03-201315.pdf; Minutes, H. 
Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm. 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 8–13 (Alaska Apr. 17, 
2001), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HHES2001-04-171502. 
pdf. 
 52. The Dying Process: Five Wishes Document, http://www. 
learningplaceonline.com/stages/together/wishes/wishes-1.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 
2005) [hereinafter Five Wishes Document]. 
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The 2001 version of the bill closely resembled the Five Wishes 
document, including the many details of comfort care.53  However, 
by 2002, legislative committees had substantially rewritten the bill;54 
eventually, the finished product was merely “inspired by” the Five 
Wishes.55 
The Five Wishes document is a personal document not a legal 
document, and, as such, is written in lay language.  By contrast, the 
AHCDA is more comforting to lawyers, as it is drafted in the style 
of a legal document and employs language and stylistic trends 
familiar to lawyers.56 
The legislature’s desire to provide something similar to the 
Five Wishes explains those portions of the AHCDA related to the 
healthcare directive, but those portions account for less than half of 
the total Act.  The rest of the bill was explained as an attempt to 
bring together, under a single chapter, a variety of laws which 
previously had been scattered throughout the statutes.57  The bill 
can be said to have accomplished this.58 
 
 53. Compare H.B. 197, 22d Leg. 13, 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001) with Five Wishes 
Document, supra note 52, Part B, Wish 3. 
 54. Compare H.B. 197, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001) with H.B. 197, 22d 
Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2002). 
 55.  Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 6 
(Alaska May 16, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2003-05-161351. pdf. 
 56. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300, pt. 2(6)(B)(i)–(ii) (2004) (defining “a 
condition of permanent unconsciousness”  as “a condition that, to a high degree of 
medical certainty, will last permanently without improvement; in which, to a high 
degree of medical certainty, thought, sensation, purposeful action, social 
interaction, and awareness of myself and the environment are absent; and for 
which, to a high degree of medical certainty, initiating or continuing life sustaining 
procedures for me, in light of my medical outcome, will provide only minimal 
medical benefit for me”) with Five Wishes Document, supra note 52 (using terms 
such as being “close to death,” “in a coma and not expected to wake up or 
recover,” or “have permanent and severe brain damage and are not expected to 
recover”). 
 57. Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 8 
(Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/ 
23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary. Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess. 
9–10 (Alaska Apr. 10, 2002), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/H 
JUD2002-04-101318.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess. 37 
(Alaska Mar. 20, 2002), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/ 
HJUD2002-03-201315.pdf. 
 58. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010–.100 (2002) (repealed 2004) (living 
wills and “Do Not Resuscitate” protocols), 13.50.010–.070 (repealed 2004) (organ 
donation), 47.30.950–.980 (mental health powers of attorney).  Current versions at 
ALASKA STAT. § 13.52 (2004). 
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For the most part, philosophical discussions about end-of-life 
issues did not occur in the legislature until 2004, when the bill 
reached the Senate HESS Committee.  The chairman, Senator Fred 
Dyson (R-Eagle River), raised a number of questions about life 
support termination, as did the Alaska Catholic Conference.59  In 
addition to numerous committee meetings, a meeting was held off 
record and included the Alaska Catholic Conference’s 
representative, the Lieutenant Governor’s chief of staff, and a staff 
member of a legislator who advocated passage of the bill.60 As a 
result of this meeting, a number of changes were made to the bill, 
including the addition of a broad statement that, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary of the patient’s intent, the AHCDA 
established a presumption in favor of life,61 and a clarification that 
the AHCDA does not authorize mercy killing, assisted suicide, or 
euthanasia.62  The changes did not entirely satisfy the Catholic 
Conference63 but seemed to assuage the concerns of Senator 
Dyson, for when the bill moved to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Senator Dyson advocated its passage.64 
One of the more interesting exchanges in the Senate HESS 
Committee centered on the issue of pregnancy.  Senator Dyson, 
who described himself as “irrevocably pro-life regarding the 
abortion issue” took the position that if a pregnant woman was in 
an unconscious state, efforts should be made to keep the child 
alive, even if that meant continuing life support past a point of 
physical benefit for the woman.65  Senator Gretchen Guess 
(D-Anchorage) took the position that the statute should not 
overturn a healthcare directive and that the healthcare directive 
ought to have an option for a pregnant woman to determine 
whether she would want to be kept alive so that the child might be 
 
 59. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 6, 18 
(Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2004-03-081333.pdf. 
 60. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 24 
(Alaska Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2004-03-241344.pdf. 
 61. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.120(a) (2004). 
 62. § 13.52.120(d). 
 63. Minutes, S. Judiciary Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 16 (Alaska Apr. 29, 2004), 
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/SJUD2004-04-290808.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 11–12 
(Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2004-03-081333.pdf. 
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born.66  This seems to have led to an odd compromise under which 
the statute and the sample form say two different things.  In the 
sample form67 the declarant is to answer the question “should I 
become unconscious and I am pregnant, I direct that” (followed by 
several blank lines).  However, a section of the AHCDA says that, 
if a pregnant woman lacks capacity, a directive or decision to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures may not be given 
effect if it is probable that the fetus could develop to the point of 
live birth with the provision of such life-sustaining procedures.68  In 
other words, if life support will enable the baby to be born alive, 
then life support must be continued, regardless of what the mother 
might have said in her directive.  So the AHCDA itself would 
overrule a directive to discontinue life support.  The resolution of 
any tension between a directive and the AHCDA may hinge on 
whether the doctor has actually read the statute or only the 
approved statutory form. 
After four years of testimony, committee hearings, committee 
substitutes, and debate, the final version of House Bill 25 passed 
the Senate unanimously, and was then adopted by the House with 
only one dissenting House vote.69 The governor signed the Act the 
following month, and it took effect on January 1, 2005.70 
IV.  PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
A central premise of this article posits that people approach 
end-of-life issues from three different philosophical positions.  This 
section of the Article will analyze how each of these positions 
ultimately influenced the adoption of the AHCDA. 
A.   Self-Determination 
The first of these positions is an emphasis on self-
determination, that is, the ability to make one’s own decisions 
about one’s own life.  This is usually referenced as a “constitutional 
right” to self-determination.  In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of 
Health,71 a case involving a woman in a vegetative state whose 
 
 66. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 12, 29 
(Alaska Apr. 14, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2004-04-141341.pdf (testimony of Sen. Gretchen Guess). 
 67. ALASKA STAT.  13.52.300, pt. 2(6)(E) (2004). 
 68. § 13.52.055(b). 
 69. H.J. 23, 2d Sess., at 4026 (Alaska 2004); S.J. 23, 2d Sess., at 3248 (Alaska 
2004). 
 70. H.J. 23, 2d Sess., at 4508 (Alaska 2004). 
 71. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
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family wanted to remove her feeding tube, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the early common law rule that 
individuals are to be free from the restraint or interference of 
others72 and the requirement for informed consent to medical 
treatment73 suggested that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment.74  The Court noted in Cruzan that this right to 
self-determination may also extend to allowing others to exercise 
what it called a substituted judgment.75 Substituted judgment 
involves informing the medical providers of what the patient, 
presumably unable to express his or her own wishes, would have 
wanted regarding cessation of medical treatment. Interestingly, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion does not actually find 
that there is a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, but 
rather notes that such a right could be inferred from the Court’s 
previous decisions.76  In the subsequent case of Washington v. 
Glucksberg,77 the Court, again in an opinion written by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, noted that while that right could be inferred 
(since it had been “strongly suggested” by previous opinions), it 
had not actually been pronounced by the Court.78 
B. Sanctity of Life 
The second significant philosophical position represents an 
emphasis on the sanctity of life.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized this position, not as a constitutional right, but as a 
legitimate state interest,79 which a state can consider in establishing 
laws.  In Cruzan, it was this interest, among others, that justified 
allowing Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence that the 
individual would want life support terminated.80  In Glucksberg, the 
state’s interest in the preservation of life was a factor in upholding 
the state of Washington’s prohibition of assisted suicide.81 
 
 72. Id. at 267 (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891)). 
 73. Id. at 269 (citing Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 
1914)). 
 74. Id. at 278. 
 75. Id. at 284. 
 76. See id. at 278–79. 
 77. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 78. See id. at 720. 
 79. Id. at 728–29; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
 80. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
 81. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–29. 
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C. Quality of Life 
A patient’s quality of life has never been specifically 
recognized as either a legitimate interest or a right by the Supreme 
Court.  Nonetheless, concern for a patient’s quality of life 
influenced the debate over the AHCDA. 
A moderate quality of life position may be defined as concern 
for the pain and misery that accompany the end of life.  An 
extreme position suggests that once one is no longer able to do 
anything useful, productive, or interesting, one ought to die. 
Various courts and professional groups have taken diverging 
positions on this philosophical question. 
In In re Quinlan,82 the New Jersey Supreme Court factored 
into its decision-making calculus the likelihood of the patient ever 
returning to “cognitive life,” thus taking a position somewhere 
between the moderate and the extreme positions outlined above.83 
In one survey of doctors and medical administrators, a 
remarkable 89% believed it was ethical to withdraw nutrition and 
hydration from patients in a vegetative state, with a majority 
endorsing the view that patients in a vegetative state would be 
“better off dead.”84  One version of this philosophy was expressed 
in the legislative hearings on the AHCDA by Dr. Maria 
Wallington, a medical ethicist.85  She testified that the decision to 
terminate life support should hinge on whether “what is needed to 
keep the person alive actually allows him/her to go on with life” or 
the chance the person will become healthy again and not depend 
on medical care.86 
Remarkably, throughout the lengthy history of committee 
hearings and floor debates in 2001, 2002, and 2003, there was 
hardly any examination of the philosophical underpinnings of the 
law, which initially appeared to be strongly influenced by the right 
to self-determination.  Throughout the committee minutes, 
legislators appeared to assume that people should be able to make 
their own choices regarding end-of-life decisions.87  Examples, both 
 
 82. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 83. Id. at 664. 
 84. Kirk Payne et al., Physicians’ Attitudes about the Care of Patients in the 
Persistent Vegetative State: A National Survey, 125 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 
104, 105 (1996). 
 85. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 12-14 
(Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/SHES 
2004-04-071745.pdf. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st 
Sess. 17 (Alaska Feb. 27, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/ 
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good and bad, were given from the personal experiences of 
witnesses and legislators.88  However, no one raised much concern 
for the sanctity of life, until the bill reached the Senate HESS 
Committee in March 2004.89  At that point, intertwined with the 
debate over the pregnancy provisions of the bill and the 
hammering out of various details, the concern for the sanctity of 
life finally surfaced.90  Senator Dyson and the Alaska Catholic 
Conference raised the issue, and a few witnesses took opposing 
positions.91 
Notably, a significant portion of the debate centered on the 
issue of withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.92  Senator 
Dyson raised this as a main question about the bill in the opening 
 
M/HHES2003-02-271504.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 
23d Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.legis. 
state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm., 
22d Leg., 2d Sess. 12 (Alaska Apr. 10, 2002), available at http://www.legis. 
state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HJUD2002-04-101318.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and 
Soc. Serv. Comm., 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 27 (Alaska Apr. 24, 2001), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HHES2001-04-241508.pdf; Minutes, H. 
Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 8 (Alaska Apr. 17, 2001), 
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HHES2001-04-171502.pdf. 
 88. See, e.g., Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st 
Sess. 6 (Alaska May 16, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/ 
M/SHES2003-05-161351.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d 
Leg., 1st Sess. 20–21 (Alaska Feb. 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-271504.pdf; Minutes, H. 
Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 3-4 (Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), 
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf; 
Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess. 11 (Alaska Apr. 10, 2002), 
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HJUD2002-04-101318.pdf; 
Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 11 (Alaska 
Apr. 17, 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/ 22/M/HHES2001-04-
171502.pdf. 
 89. See Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 18-
19 (Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/ 
M/SHES2004-03-081333.pdf. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Including, curiously, Dr. Maria Wallington, who purported to represent 
Providence Health Systems, which is owned by Sisters of Providence, a branch of 
the Roman Catholic Church.  With the Alaska Catholic Conference (representing 
the Catholic bishops in Alaska) on one side of several issues, and Dr. Wallington 
of Providence Health Systems on the other, two different agencies of the Roman 
Catholic Church (sometimes thought to be “monolithic”) weighed in on opposite 
sides of the debate.  See id. at 8. 
 92. Id. at 14–19. 
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of his committee’s hearing.93  A representative of the Alaska 
Nurses’ Association argued that withholding fluid and nutrition 
actually allows a patient to die naturally.94  Dr. Wallington argued 
that the law should safeguard the choices made in a person’s 
advance directive.95  On the other hand, the Alaska Catholic 
Conference representative argued that the law should have a strong 
presumption in favor of life, quoting the statement of then-Pope 
John Paul II that administration of water and food always 
represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act, 
even when provided by artificial means. 96 
Ultimately, for the most part, the resulting bill is based on the 
right to self-determination, with a few specific overlays based on 
concern for the sanctity of life.  Life support, including artificial 
nutrition and hydration, can be withdrawn only if the person is in a 
state of permanent unconsciousness (meaning a coma or a 
permanent vegetative state, depending on how one interprets the 
definitions) or has a terminal illness.97  A surrogate, whether 
appointed by the patient or selected according to the statutory 
procedure, can make decisions for the patient; but in doing so, the 
surrogate must consider the patient’s personal values, including any 
religious beliefs.98  Life support may not be withdrawn for a 
pregnant woman if her child could survive to birth with the 
procedures in place.99  Further, a healthcare provider may decline 
to provide “medically ineffective health care or healthcare contrary 
to generally accepted health care standards,” but only after 
providing the family an opportunity to transfer the patient to 
another institution.100  Finally, the AHCDA explicitly states that, in 
the absence of evidence of the patient’s intent to the contrary, the 
law establishes a presumption in favor of life, consistent with the 
patient’s best interest.101 
 
 93. Id. at 7. 
 94. Id. at 9. 
 95. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 12 
(Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/ 
M/SHES2004-04-071745.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 20. 
 97. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.52.045, .390 (2004). 
 98. §§ 13.52.030(g), .390(6)(G). 
 99. § 13.52.055. 
 100. § 13.52.060(f)–(g). 
 101. § 13.52.120. 
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D. Distrust of Lawyers 
A distrust for lawyers seems, if only speculatively, to have 
influenced the bill.  Such distrust is evidenced by the fact that the 
AHCDA vests final decision-making authority in patients, their 
agents, or their surrogates, with some limited rights-of-refusal or 
review by their doctors.102  Further, doctors, not courts, decide 
whether a person lacks capacity.103  A doctor may decline to comply 
with a surrogate’s decisions if he or she believes that the surrogate 
is not abiding by the wishes, values, and best interest of the 
patient.104  The doctor can otherwise refuse to comply with the 
individual instruction or decision for a variety of reasons, such as 
“reasons of conscience,”105 or a belief that the proposed treatment 
would be ineffective or contrary to generally accepted healthcare 
standards.106  It is the doctor who ultimately decides whether to 
issue a “Do Not Resuscitate” order.107  The AHCDA grants 
healthcare providers fairly broad immunity in making these 
decisions.108  The role of the judiciary receives only the briefest 
mention,109 and an agent’s healthcare decision can even overrule the 
decision of a court-appointed guardian (unless a court order 
specifically provides otherwise).110 
In his book Strangers at the Bedside,111 historian David 
Rothman chronicles how, beginning in the 1960s, the United States 
evolved from a society of unwavering acceptance of the decisions 
of doctors to a society in which lawyers, bioethicists, politicians, 
judges, and ethics committees are involved in the decision-making.  
He credits the shift in part to the fact that most Americans no 
longer have a trusted family doctor whom they know well enough 
to trust with end-of-life decisions.112  Nonetheless, the AHCDA 
places some of the decision-making authority directly into the 
physician’s hands.113  Thus, the AHCDA assumes that patients want 
 
 102. See §§ 13.52.010-.395. 
 103. § 13.52.010(g). 
 104. § 13.52.030(h). 
 105. § 13.52.060(e). 
 106. § 13.52.060 (f). 
 107. § 13.52.065. 
 108. § 13.52.080. 
 109. § 13.52.140. 
 110. § 13.52.040(b). 
 111. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW 
LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (Walter de 
Gruyter 2003) (1991). 
 112. See id. at 128–31. 
 113. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300, pt. 5 (2004); see also § 13.52.030(h). 
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their primary physicians to make such decisions.  This is a 
questionable assumption in an age when many people go to a clinic, 
family practice group, or emergency room for primary care.  At no 
point did legislators discuss this issue in the many committee 
hearings on the bill.  Therefore, whether the AHCDA reflects an 
atavistic view of primary physicians or merely a general hesitancy 
to let lawyers make these decisions is uncertain.114 
An emphasis on decision making by physicians may have also 
resulted from the drafters’ focus on patients with pre-existing 
medical conditions, rather than on those who fill out the advance 
directive form as part of general estate planning.115  For instance, 
the designation of a primary physician will typically pose little 
problem for someone with cancer, who would likely designate his 
or her oncologist.  Regardless, under the AHCDA, nearly all end-
of-life decisions will be made by doctors in consultation with family 
members, and very few decisions will be made by judges. 
V.  APPLICATION TO CASES 
One rarely appreciates the implications of a statute until one 
applies the statute to a set of facts.  This part of the Article will 
examine some of the best-known cases from recent memory to 
determine how they might have turned out under the AHCDA. 
A. Karen Ann Quinlan 
In April of 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, a twenty-one year old 
New Jersey woman, stopped breathing.116  She was revived, but 
suffered anoxia, or a loss of oxygen in the blood stream going to 
the brain.117  Quinlan ended up in a “chronic persistent vegetative 
state,” which was explained as a “primitive reflex level” of 
neurological function, with the brain stem working, but other parts 
of the brain nonfunctional.118  She was sustained by a respirator and 
feeding tube, and it was assumed by the doctors (incorrectly, as it 
 
 114. The Alaska Legislature has invariably had fewer attorney members than 
most legislatures.  In the current 24th Alaska Legislature, only eleven of sixty 
legislators hold law degrees, according to their legislative web sites. See Alaska 
Leg. State Senate, http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/senate/24/senate.htm (last visited Oct. 
19, 2005); Alaska Leg. H. R., http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/house/24/house.htm (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2005). 
 115. See, e.g., Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d 
Sess. 11–22 (Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/ 
M/SHES2004-04-071745.pdf. 
 116. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653–54 (N.J. 1976). 
 117. Id. at 654. 
 118. Id. at 654–55. 
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turned out) that her primitive level of brain stem function would be 
insufficient for her to breathe on her own.119 
Karen’s father filed a petition, asking that he be appointed 
guardian and that the letters of guardianship contain an express 
power to authorize the discontinuance of all extraordinary medical 
procedures.120  The hospital opposed the discontinuance, and the 
judge denied the father’s request.121  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey found that if Karen were able to do so, she could 
decide to discontinue the life support apparatus.122  Addressing the 
question of substitution of judgment, the court determined that her 
guardian could “assert her right to privacy” on her behalf.123  The 
court did not assert a broad right of guardians to make such 
decisions, but rather found such a right to be reasonable within the 
context of these particular facts.124  In doing so, the court balanced 
the individual’s right to privacy against the State’s interest in the 
preservation and sanctity of human life and a physician’s right to 
administer medical treatment according to his best judgment.125  
The court applied a sliding scale, finding that the State’s interest 
weakened, and the individual’s right to privacy grew, “as the 
degree of bodily invasion increase[d] and the prognosis 
dim[med].”126  The court incorporated consideration of Karen’s 
quality of life into the analysis.127  It said that the “focal point of 
decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of 
return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced 
continuance of that biological vegetative existence to which Karen 
seems to be doomed.”128  As the court’s words indicate, the quality 
of life philosophical position is implicated whenever the focus is on 
the possibility of returning to a sapient or more productive level of 
life.129 
 
 119. See id. at 655. 
 120. Id. at 651. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 663. 
 123. Id. at 664. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 663–64.  The doctors in this case were opposed to the removal of life 
support.  Id. at 663. 
 126. Id. at 664. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 669. 
 129. Conversely, the sanctity of life position would tend to consider any life as 
being valuable, even if it were sub-cognitive.  The self-determination position 
would be neutral unless the patient had expressed her wishes in some way. 
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The court announced a rather curious requirement for 
termination of life support:  although the father was appointed 
guardian, in order to terminate life support he had to obtain the 
concurrence of the rest of the family.130  Furthermore, the attending 
physicians, in consultation with the hospital ethics committee, had 
to determine that there was no reasonable possibility of Karen ever 
emerging from her vegetative state.131 
How would the Quinlan case be analyzed under the AHCDA?  
Because Karen did not have an advance healthcare directive,132 her 
father would have turned to the surrogacy statute,133 and because 
she had no spouse or adult child, her father would be next in line to 
be Karen’s surrogate under the AHCDA.134  Therefore, he would 
have the authority to act, assuming Karen’s mother did not 
object.135 
As surrogate, Mr. Quinlan would inform the attending 
physician that he wanted life support removed.  The doctor would 
turn to section 13.52.045 and see that, because Karen did not sign a 
directive to the contrary, he would not be prohibited from 
removing the life support.136 
Next, the same section would direct him over to section 
13.52.160 to see whether Karen had a “qualifying condition.”137  
That section does not actually define “qualifying condition,” but 
rather requires that the determination be made by the patient’s 
primary physician and at least one other physician.138  A “qualifying 
condition” is defined in section 13.52.390(36) as either a terminal 
condition or permanent unconsciousness.139 
The definition of “terminal condition” is “an incurable or 
irreversible illness or injury” that will result in imminent death, for 
which there is no reasonable prospect of cure or recovery, that 
imposes severe pain or an inhumane burden on the patient, and for 
which continuing life sustaining procedures will provide only 
 
 130. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671–72. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 664. 
 133. ALASKA STAT.  § 13.52.030 (2004). 
 134. § 13.52.030(c). 
 135. Karen’s mother would have the same right as Karen’s father to declare 
herself a surrogate.  See id. 
 136. § 13.52.045. 
 137. Id. 
 138. § 13.52.160.  In the case of permanent unconsciousness, the doctors must 
also consult with a neurologist.  Id. 
 139. § 13.52.390(36). 
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minimal medical benefit.140  The definition of “terminal condition” 
would be problematic here, because there was no guarantee that 
Karen would die within a “short period of time” if life-sustaining 
procedures were discontinued.141  Additionally, Karen’s family 
members did not request removal of the feeding tube, further 
casting doubt on whether removal of the respirator would result in 
death.142 
The doctor would next turn to the definition of “permanent 
unconsciousness”: a condition that will last “permanently without 
improvement,” in which thought, sensation, purposeful action, 
social interaction, and awareness of self and the environment are 
absent, and for which initiating or continuing life sustaining 
procedures provide only minimal medical benefit.143  This definition 
is also problematic for a person in a vegetative state because it 
requires that sensation be absent.144  Doctors seem to be in some 
disagreement as to whether a patient in a persistent vegetative state 
feels pain.145  If Karen felt pain, one would assume sensation was 
not absent, and the definition of permanent unconsciousness could 
not legitimately be met.146  There is no general consensus in 
neurology on this issue, probably due to the fact that although 
patients in a vegetative state react to painful stimuli,147 they lack a 
connection to the “higher” parts of the brain that understand what 
pain is.148  According to one survey of doctors, about 30% of the 
respondents believe that vegetative state patients experience pain, 
 
 140. § 13.52.390(42). 
 141. In fact, to everyone’s surprise, after the respirator was eventually removed, 
Karen Quinlan lived for another ten years.  Ascension Health, Healthcare Ethics 
Cases: Quinlan, Karen Ann, http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/ 
cases/case21.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 
 142. The Quinlan family was strict Roman Catholic and made the decision to 
remove her from the respirator only after consultation with, and approval by, the 
church, which would not have approved removal of the feeding tube. In re 
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 657–60 (N.J. 1976). 
 143. § 13.52.390(31). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Payne et al., supra note 84, at 105 tbl. 2. 
 146. For instance, the Cruzan decisions made several references to her 
responses to painful stimuli.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
266–67 n.1 (1990) (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1989)). 
 147. Jan Kassubek et al., Activation of a Residual Cortical Network During 
Painful Stimulation in Long-term Postanoxic Vegetative State, 212 J. 
NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 85, 88 (2003). 
 148. See generally S. Laureys et al., Cortical Processing of Noxious 
Somatosensory Stimuli in the Persistent Vegetative State, 17 NEUROIMAGE 732 
(2002). 
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and about 13% believe they experience hunger and thirst.149  Given 
that the majority of doctors believe there is no sensation, combined 
with the possibility of “doctor shopping” by the family,150 it is 
probably safe to assume that the Quinlans could, today, find a 
doctor who agrees that Karen meets the criteria for “permanent 
unconsciousness.”  This is even further evident when considering 
that 88% of the doctors responding to the survey believed it was 
ethical to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient 
in a vegetative state.151 
The legislative history also yields some guidance.  The 
definition of “permanent unconsciousness” was based on an Illinois 
statute,152 which includes the mandate that sensation be absent.153  
While the Illinois courts have not specifically addressed the 
question of whether reaction to painful stimuli constitutes 
sensation, several Illinois Supreme Court decisions have concluded 
that the condition of permanent unconsciousness covers the patient 
in a vegetative state.154  Also, during legislative hearings in 2004, the 
Alaska legislative aide who had been shepherding the bill through 
the legislature specifically referenced “vegetative state” among the 
circumstances that would constitute a qualifying condition for 
purposes of removal of life support.155 
Let us assume that the primary physician and one other 
doctor, after consulting with the neurologist,156 have informed the 
attending physician that at least one of the qualifying conditions 
has been met, either because they assume Karen will die within a 
short period of time without life support or because they believe 
she does not have sensation.  The matter would then be back in the 
hands of the attending physician, who would return to section 
 
 149. See Payne et al., supra note 84, at 105. 
 150. Nothing in the AHCDA, or other Alaska laws, prohibit the surrogate from 
looking for another doctor who agrees with him or her.  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52 
(2004). 
 151. Payne et al., supra note 84, at 107. 
 152. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess.  25 
(Alaska Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2004-03-241344.pdf (testimony of Linda Sylvester). 
 153. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10 (2005). 
 154. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ill. 1990); In re 
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 298 (Ill. 1989). 
 155. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 24 
(Alaska Apr. 14, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2004-04-141341.pdf (testimony of Linda Sylvester). 
 156. The neurologist does not have to agree with the primary physician; he or 
she only needs to be consulted.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.160 (2004). 
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13.52.045 and see that there must be an additional determination 
that withdrawing the life support would be consistent with the 
patient’s best interest.157  However, this decision is initially made by 
the surrogate.158  The doctor would thus direct Mr. Quinlan to make 
the determination and, to the extent known to him, to consider 
Karen’s wishes and personal values.159  He would explain that “best 
interest” means that the benefits to the individual outweigh the 
burdens on the individual.  In this decision, several factors should 
be considered: “the effect of treatment on the physical, emotional, 
and cognitive functions of the patient”; “the degree of pain or 
discomfort caused by either treatment or withdrawal of treatment”; 
the degree to which Karen’s medical condition results in a severe 
and continuing impairment; the effect of treatment on her life 
expectancy; the prognosis for recovery; the risks, side effects, and 
benefits of treating or not treating; and Karen’s religious beliefs 
and basic values.160  Presumably, Mr. Quinlan would report back 
that he has considered all of those factors and still believes it to be 
in Karen’s best interest to withdraw life support. 
The decision would now go back to the medical professionals 
for several possible vetoes.  First, the patient’s primary healthcare 
provider may determine that the surrogate is not abiding by the 
wishes, values, and best interest of the patient, and may therefore 
decline to comply with the surrogate’s decision.161  Alternatively, 
the healthcare provider may decline to comply for reasons of 
conscience.162  It is hard to say whether Karen’s physicians would 
veto the surrogate’s decision; they testified that “removal from the 
respirator would not conform to medical practices, standards and 
traditions,”163 but that standard is not recognizably close to the 
standard under the AHCDA.164  Under the AHCDA, a healthcare 
provider can refuse to provide healthcare contrary to generally 
accepted healthcare standards.165  But here it would not be a 
question of providing healthcare, but rather of withdrawing it.  As 
best as can be determined from the case law, the doctors never 
asserted an objection of conscience.166  However, they might have 
 
 157. § 13.52.045. 
 158. Id. 
 159. § 13.52.030(g). 
 160. § 13.52.390(6). 
 161. § 13.52.030(h). 
 162. § 13.52.060(e). 
 163. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976). 
 164. See § 13.52.060(f). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647–72. 
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argued that removal was not in Karen’s best interest, especially in 
1976. 
If either side chose to go to court, they could do so under 
section 13.52.140, which provides that a court, through a 
guardianship proceeding, may enjoin or direct a healthcare 
decision.167  A probate court judge adjudicating Karen’s case would 
need to know what legal standard to apply, and immediately he or 
she would encounter a problem: there is an apparent error in the 
section on judicial relief.  Section 13.52.140 says that a proceeding 
to enjoin or direct a healthcare decision is governed by sections 
13.26.165–.320.168  However, these statutory sections do not cover 
adult guardianships, but rather conservatorships.169  In Alaska, 
conservators deal only with financial matters, not with medical 
decisions,170 and the procedural protections are less than those for 
appointment of a guardian.171  The statute should have referenced 
sections 13.26.090–.155, for guardians of incapacitated adults. 
There is, within those sections, a specific provision as to what a 
guardian is or is not allowed to do: 
A guardian may not . . . consent on behalf of the ward to the 
withholding of lifesaving medical procedures; however, a 
guardian is not required to oppose the cessation or withholding 
of lifesaving medical procedures when those procedures will 
serve only to prolong the dying process and offer no reasonable 
expectation of effecting a temporary or permanent cure of or 
relief from the illness or condition being treated unless the ward 
has clearly stated that lifesaving medical procedures not be 
withheld . . . .172 
Is the probate court to look only to this section of the 
guardianship statutes and determine whether a guardian is fulfilling 
that duty, or is the probate court to look at the AHCDA and 
review all of its decision-making requirements (including whether 
the patient has a qualifying condition, and whether it is in the 
patient’s best interest to withdraw life support)?  That question will 
undoubtedly have to be answered in future litigation. 
At any rate, the likely end result is that Karen Quinlan would 
still have her respirator removed, as she would be found to have 
met the standards of both the guardianship and healthcare decision 
laws related to removal of life support.  In fact, Karen continued to 
 
 167. § 13.52.140. 
 168. Id. 
 169. §§ 13.26.165-.320. 
 170. § 13.26.280. 
 171. See §§ 13.26.165-.320. 
 172. § 13.26.150(e)(3). 
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breathe after removal of the respirator173 and could survive for as 
long as she had the feeding tube inserted.174  Under the AHCDA, 
she could have the tube removed only upon her father’s consent or 
if the doctors concluded that it was “medically ineffective health 
care,”175 a problematic standard that will be examined in more 
detail in the Sun Hudson case below. 
B. Nancy Beth Cruzan 
In January 1983, a Missouri woman, Nancy Cruzan, was in a 
serious automobile accident.176  Paramedics were able to restore her 
breathing and heart beat.177  After three weeks in a coma, she 
progressed to a vegetative state.178  She was able to take some food 
orally, but in order to ease the feeding and ensure that she had 
sufficient nutrition, a “gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube” 
was surgically inserted.179  However, after several years with no 
improvement, Nancy’s parents, who had already been appointed as 
co-guardians, petitioned in Missouri state court for authority to 
remove the feeding tube.180 
Initially, the only evidence as to Nancy’s own wishes was 
testimony by a former roommate that Nancy once said that she 
would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least 
halfway normally.181  The trial court authorized the withdrawal of 
life support, but the state appealed.182  The Missouri Supreme Court 
reversed, based on Missouri’s living will statute, which had a policy 
strongly favoring preservation of life.183  Specifically, Missouri 
required clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes for 
removal of life support when there was not a specific advance 
directive.184  The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Missouri 
had a legitimate interest in the protection and preservation of 
 
 173. Ascension Health, Healthcare Ethics Cases: Quinlan, Karen Ann, 
http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/cases/case21.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 
2005). 
 174. Id. 
 175. § 13.52.060 (f). 
 176. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 267–68. 
 181. Id. at 268. 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. at 265. 
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human life, which it was entitled to safeguard with a statute 
designed to guard against potential abuses.185 
There, the case law ends, but not the case.  The publicity 
surrounding Cruzan brought forward two new witnesses who had 
known Nancy before her accident and who learned about the case 
through the news coverage surrounding the appeal.186  They both 
related conversations with Nancy, which supported the idea that 
she would not want to live in a vegetative state.187 Aided by 
friendlier medical testimony the second time around, Mr. and Mrs. 
Cruzan prevailed in a new trial; third-party attempts to intervene 
and appeal were refused, and the feeding tube was removed, 
resulting in Nancy Cruzan’s death twelve days later.188 
In many respects, Nancy Cruzan’s situation was similar to that 
of Karen Quinlan.  However, a significant difference is that Nancy 
Cruzan did not need a respirator.189  However, she did need a 
feeding tube, and unlike the Quinlans, the Cruzan family wanted 
the feeding tube removed.190  The AHCDA makes no distinction 
between respirators and feeding tubes; they are all considered “life 
sustaining procedures” that may be withheld if the qualifying 
conditions are met.191  This distinction may make a big difference to 
the Roman Catholic Church and, judging by the number of 
protestors in both the Cruzan and Schiavo cases,192 to quite a lot of 
other people as well.  However, it makes no legal difference in 
Alaska.  It should be noted that defining artificial hydration and 
nutrition as medical care constitutes a significant philosophical 
choice on the legislature’s part; the Catholic Church, among others, 
 
 185. Id. at 282. 
 186. WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 
333–36 (2002). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 341–89. 
 189. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988). Another potentially 
significant difference is that Cruzan was married at the time of her accident.  
However, Cruzan’s husband agreed to dissolution of their marriage before the 
case reached the point of contested litigation. COLBY, supra note 187, at 29.  
Hence, Cruzan’s marriage does not affect the outcome of the analysis. 
 190. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d. at 410–11. 
 191. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.390(26) (2004). 
 192. COLBY, supra note 18, at 371–77; All Things Considered: Protesters at 
Schiavo Hospice Grow Agitated  (NPR broadcast Mar. 27, 2005); Larry Copeland 
and Laura Parker, Terri Schiavo’s Case Doesn’t End With Her Passing, USA 
Today, Apr. 1, 2005, at A1. 
110805 03_KIRK.DOC 1/3/2006  4:50 PM 
238 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:2 
would define it not as medical care but as feeding, and thus a basic 
responsibility which must not be withdrawn.193 
The next difference looks like a complication, but it actually 
leads to a simplification: Nancy Cruzan’s parents were already her 
guardians when they decided to withhold artificial nutrition and 
hydration.194  As her guardians, they would be surprised to discover 
that the AHCDA does not grant them any authority: it only allows 
an agent or surrogate to withhold or withdraw life sustaining 
procedures.195  A guardian is not an agent or a surrogate.  The 
definition of an agent requires that the declarant have executed a 
durable power of attorney for healthcare.196 Furthermore, the 
definition of surrogate specifically excludes guardians.197 
The operation of these definitions, as they apply to the 
AHCDA, might be cause for consternation.  However, not all of 
the laws related to end-of-life decision-making were included in 
Chapter 13.52.  For example, under section 13.26.150(e)(3), which 
is part of the guardianship statutes, a guardian can oppose cessation 
of “life saving medical procedures” under a set of conditions 
similar to those in the AHCDA.198  The guardian may consent to 
the withholding of such procedures when “[the procedures] will 
only serve to prolong the dying process, and offer no reasonable 
expectation of effecting a cure of or relief from the condition being 
treated if the ward has not clearly stated that the life sustaining 
medical procedures not be withheld . . . .”199  While Nancy never 
prohibited such procedures from being withheld,200 another portion 
of that set of conditions is problematic.  It refers to prolonging the 
dying process.  Prior to the removal of the feeding tube, Nancy was 
not dying; the consensus was that she could possibly live for 
 
 193. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 20 
(Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/ 
SHES2004-04-071745.pdf (testimony of Chip Wagoner, representing the Alaska 
Catholic Conference). 
 194. See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410. 
 195. The AHCDA states “an agent or a surrogate may determine that life-
sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn . . . .”  § 13.52.045. 
 196. § 13.52.390(2). 
 197. § 13.52.390(40). 
 198. § 13.26.150(e)(3). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Ms. Cruzan had only made general statements to a roommate that she 
would not want to continue her life unless she could live “halfway normally.”  See 
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411, 424 (Mo. 1988). 
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another thirty years.201  Unfortunately, this requirement in section 
13.26.150(e)(3) seems to have been written for terminally ill 
patients, not patients in a coma or a vegetative state.  However, 
technically speaking, the feeding tube prolongs the dying process.202  
Furthermore, the feeding tube appears to meet the other 
requirements of section 13.26.150(e) because it would offer no 
reasonable expectation of a cure or relief for Cruzan.203  Under 
these circumstances, the guardian would undoubtedly be legally 
justified in taking action.204  Nothing in the adult Guardianship 
Statutes or the AHCDA requires a guardian to seek specific court 
approval to withhold or withdraw life support.205  Under section 
13.52.140, the superior court may enjoin or direct a healthcare 
decision, but an application to the superior court is not required.206  
A healthcare decision made by a guardian is effective without 
judicial approval.207 
A question remains as to the conscience clause in section 
13.52.060(e), which allows a healthcare provider to decline to 
comply with an instruction for reasons of conscience.208  The state-
run institution in which Nancy lived out her final years strongly 
opposed, on moral grounds, the removal of the feeding tube.209  
However, the AHCDA’s conscience clause has different standards 
for healthcare providers and healthcare institutions or facilities.  
The provider may decline to comply for reasons of conscience,210 
but another provider can easily be brought in to remove the tube.  
Under the statute, the healthcare facility can object to an 
instruction only if it is contrary to a written policy of the facility 
that is expressly based on reasons of conscience.211  Nothing in the 
case law or background materials suggests that the Missouri 
Rehabilitation Center had any such written policy.  Therefore the 
facility would not have had the right to object. 
 
 201. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.1 (1990) (citing 
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411). 
 202. Nancy Valko, Of Living Wills and Butterfly Ballots, LIFEISSUES.NET, 
http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/val/val_11_livingwills.html (last visited Oct. 19, 
2005). 
 203. See § 13.26.150(e)(3). 
 204. See id. 
 205.  §§ 13.26.090-.155; §§ 13.52.010-.395. 
 206. § 13.52.040(c). 
 207. Id. 
 208. § 13.52.060. 
 209. COLBY, supra note 18, at 188–96. 
 210. § 13.52.060(e). 
 211. Id. 
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The AHCDA’s section on judicial relief allows the healthcare 
provider to petition the superior court for an injunction.212  In 
Cruzan, the facility may have sought this relief because the appeals 
featured the State of Missouri, representing its healthcare 
institution as a party, and the Cruzans as the opposing party.213  
After the appeals, the State of Missouri was dismissed from the 
guardianship case.214  Even if the State of Missouri had continued to 
be involved with the guardianship case, the guardianship statute 
would have formed the substantive basis for the decision to 
withdraw life support, and the conditions of that statute appear to 
be easily met.215 
Analyzing Cruzan’s case under the AHCDA demonstrates 
that when a patient is in a terminal, comatose, or vegetative state, 
and has not executed an advance directive, a close family member 
who wants to remove life support should not claim the status of 
surrogate.  Rather, the family member should petition to be 
appointed guardian first and then act under the guardianship 
statute.  Because the guardianship statutes were not updated to be 
consistent with the AHCDA, it is easier for a guardian to find 
sufficient legal justification to terminate life support. 
C. Teresa Marie Schindler-Schiavo 
In February of 1990, Terri Schiavo suffered a heart attack at 
the age of twenty-seven.216  The heart attack caused her to enter 
into a vegetative state.217  Her husband, Michael Schiavo, was 
appointed guardian without objection.218  By 1993, however, serious 
disagreements between Terri’s parents and Michael ensued.219  The 
parents petitioned to have Michael removed as guardian,220 and 
Michael eventually petitioned the court to allow him to remove the 
feeding tube that kept Terri alive.221  The trial court found clear and 
 
 212. § 13.52.140. 
 213. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988). 
 214. COLBY, supra note 18, at 330–31, 341. 
 215. § 13.26.150(e)(3). 
 216. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
[hereinafter Schiavo I]. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id.; see also Jay Wolfson, Guardian ad Litem, A Report to Governor Jeb 
Bush and the 6th Judicial Circuit in the Matter of Theresa Marie Schiavo 8 (Dec. 
1, 2003), available at http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/wolfson%27s%20 
report.pdf [hereinafter Wolfson Report]. 
 219. Schiavo I, 780 So.2d at 178; see also Wolfson Report, supra note 218, at 8. 
 220. Schiavo I, 780 So.2d at 177–78. 
 221. Id. at 177. 
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convincing evidence to support removal of the feeding tube.222  
Despite interventions by Terri’s parents, the Florida governor and 
legislature, and the United States Congress and President, the 
courts sided with Michael Schiavo and allowed the feeding tube to 
be removed.223  Terri Schiavo died on March 31, 2005.224 
The first court action in the Schiavo case was the uncontested 
petition by Michael Schiavo to be appointed guardian.225  Under 
Alaska law, a spouse has priority for appointment as guardian, 
unless the incapacitated person nominated someone else at a time 
when she had sufficient mental capacity to make an informed 
choice.226  A court may decline to appoint a person who has priority 
when it is in the best interest of the incapacitated person.227 
In the Schiavo case, there was initially no reason for the court 
to consider that it might not be in Terri’s best interest to appoint 
her husband as her guardian.228  When Terri’s parents petitioned to 
remove Michael as the guardian, an Alaska court would have 
turned to section 13.26.125 and found that, while the court was 
clearly empowered to remove and replace a guardian, the statutes 
do not dictate the substantive standard for taking such action.  
Subsection (e) of that section states that a guardian may be 
removed if there is “probable cause to believe [he] is not 
performing [his] responsibilities effectively and there is an 
imminent danger that the physical health or safety of the ward will 
be seriously impaired . . . .”229  However, it is clear from the context 
of that subsection that there may be other bases.230  The Alaska 
 
 222. Id. at 179. 
 223. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 11th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter 
Schiavo II]. 
 224. Abby Goodnough, Schiavo Dies, Ending Bitter Case over Feeding Tube, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com. 
 225. Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d at 177. 
 226. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145(d)(1)-(2) (2004). 
 227. § 13.26.145(f). 
 228. Later issues arose largely for two reasons.  First, Michael Schiavo took the 
position that his wife should be allowed to die. Even before applying to the court 
for an order to terminate life support, he had entered a DNR order for her.  Diana 
Lynne, The Whole Terri Schiavo Story, WORLD NET DAILY, Mar. 25, 2005, 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=43463; see also 
Wolfson Report, supra note 218, at 10.  Second, Michael began to live with a 
woman he referred to as his fiancé and with whom he had two children.  Jamie 
Thompson, She’s the Other Woman in Michael Schiavo’s Heart, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/03/26/Tampabay/ 
She_s_the_other_woman.shtml. 
 229. § 13.26.125(e). 
 230. See id. 
110805 03_KIRK.DOC 1/3/2006  4:50 PM 
242 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:2 
Supreme Court addressed this question recently in H.C.S. v. 
Community Advocacy Project of Alaska, Inc.231  The court 
concluded that before removing or replacing a guardian, the trial 
court should first determine whether there has been a material 
change in circumstances since the guardian was originally 
appointed, and if there has been, whether the existing appointment 
is in the ward’s best interest.232  Terri’s parents alleged abuse by 
Michael, but the judge found inadequate evidence of abuse.233  In 
all likelihood, the same judge who would later order removal of 
Terri’s feeding tube would not have removed Michael from his 
position as guardian for proposing a DNR order. 
This leaves the question of whether a conflict existed due to 
Michael’s romantic interest in another woman.  Nothing in the 
Alaska statutes or case law indicates whether such a conflict would 
have been sufficient, in and of itself, to justify removal.  The 
priority section of the guardianship statutes states that the court 
may not appoint a person who has “interests that may conflict with 
those of the incapacitated person.”234  However, this provision is 
included among several other bases for disqualification that relate 
to financial, not personal, interests.235  If the person is providing 
substantial services in a business or professional capacity,236 is a 
creditor of the incapacitated person,237 or is employed by someone 
else who would be disqualified,238 the person may not be appointed.  
Because the definition of a conflict of interest is unclear under this 
statute, Terri’s parents could have argued that Michael’s personal 
relationship warranted his removal.  It is this very ambiguity, 
however, that makes it impossible to say how the judge might have 
ruled. 
Note that the three cases examined thus far involved guardians 
rather than agents, and so the surrogacy section of the AHCDA 
did not apply.239  Given that all three of these women were 
relatively young and healthy before a sudden trauma placed them 
in a vegetative state, it is hardly surprising that they did not have 
 
 231. 42 P.3d 1093 (Alaska 2002); see also Wolfson Report, supra note 218, at 11, 
34 n.1. 
 232. H.C.S., 42 P.3d at 1099. 
 233. See Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 234. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145(b)(3) (2004). 
 235. § 13.26.145. 
 236. § 13.26.145(b)(1). 
 237. § 13.26.145(b)(2). 
 238. § 13.26.145(b)(4). 
 239. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653–54 (N.J. 1976); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988); Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
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appointed healthcare agents.  It should also not be surprising that 
at least two of them already had guardians,240 for the simple reason 
that in the Cruzan and Schiavo cases, the family members in 
question waited for a number of years before petitioning the court 
to remove life support.241  In the meantime, a myriad of medical and 
other decisions had to be made, so that guardianship would have 
been a normal and expected action, even if the thought of 
removing life support was on no one’s mind at the time. For 
instance, approximately 50% of patients who are diagnosed as 
being in a vegetative state one month after the injury will recover 
consciousness within a year.242  Therefore, if the patient is in a 
vegetative or minimally conscious state, as opposed to being 
comatose, there will almost certainly be significant delays before 
the issue of removing life support comes to the fore. 
There can be no surrogate under Alaska law if a guardian is 
already appointed and available.243  Thus, surrogates are unlikely to 
make life-support decisions for patients in a vegetative state 
because, by the time life support decisions are being made, the 
patient will likely have a guardian.  A variety of non-medical 
decisions need to be made for someone in a vegetative or 
minimally conscious state, so a guardian would be appointed to 
make those decisions.  A guardianship petition may be dismissed if 
there are feasible alternatives to guardianship,244 and a surrogate 
would be a feasible alternative to guardianship if only medical 
decisions need to be made. 
Another potential problem with the AHCDA exists.  Assume 
hypothetically that no one, including Michael Schiavo, had been 
appointed Terri’s guardian.  Suppose instead he argued for 
surrogate status under the AHCDA.  In the absence of a 
designation by the patient as to whom she wanted as her surrogate, 
the first priority for appointment goes to the spouse, “unless legally 
separated.”245  One might naturally assume that because he had 
moved in with another woman, fathered two children by her, and 
began referring to her as his fiancée, Michael Schiavo would be 
considered legally separated from his wife.  That would be an 
incorrect assumption.  Legal separation has a specific meaning in 
 
 240. In the Quinlan case, the issue of termination of life support came up in the 
initial litigation over the appointment of a guardian.  Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651. 
 241. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411, 413; Schiavo I, 780 So.2d at 177–78. 
 242. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent 
Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1572 (1994). 
 243. § 13.52.030(a). 
 244. § 13.26.113(d). 
 245. § 13.52.030(c)(1). 
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Alaska, and it is not based on the general facts of the case, but 
rather on whether a decree of legal separation has been entered 
under section 25.24.450.246  Because there was no legal separation 
decree between Michael and Terri Schiavo, Michael would still 
have been entitled to priority to be the surrogate, despite his 
conflicted circumstances.  The primary healthcare provider could 
decline to comply with specific decisions made by Michael,247 but 
not with his right to be the surrogate.  Of course the hospital, the 
parents, or any other interested person could petition for judicial 
relief under section 13.52.140 or guardianship under section 
13.26.105. 
Assuming Michael was able to maintain his position as 
guardian, we would again return to the statutes to determine his 
authority to consent to withdrawal of life-saving medical 
procedures.  As in the Cruzan case, the question would be whether 
the procedures in question serve only to prolong the dying process 
and offer no reasonable expectation of effecting a temporary or 
permanent cure or relief from the illness or condition being 
treated.248  Suppose for the sake of argument no one had been 
appointed guardian, and Michael was seeking to act under 
surrogacy authority.  He would have to establish, among other 
things, that his wife was in a state of permanent unconsciousness,249 
and again there is the question of whether she experienced 
sensation.250 Terri’s autopsy report indicated that, toward the end of 
her life, she was given acetaminophen,251 but it is unclear whether 
this was for pain, fever, or inflammation.  If the definition of 
permanent unconsciousness in the AHCDA is interpreted literally, 
surrogates will not be able to terminate life support for patients 
such as Nancy Cruzan and Terri Schiavo.  The statute states that 
thought, sensation, purposeful action, social interaction, and 
awareness of self and the environment must be absent for the 
person to be found permanently unconscious.252  A literal 
interpretation means that each of those five prongs must be absent, 
so that if the patient still experiences sensation, they are not 
 
 246. § 25.24.450. 
 247. § 13.52.030(h). 
 248. § 13.26.150(e)(3). 
 249. This state is known as a “qualifying condition.”  § 13.52.390(36). 
 250. See AUTOPSY REPORT OF THERESA SCHIAVO, CASE # 5050439 1 (June 13, 
2005), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/schiavo/61305autopsyrpt.pdf. 
 251. Id. 
 252. § 13.52.390(31)(b). 
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permanently unconscious.253  However, under Illinois law, sensation 
is interpreted as consciousness, and under this interpretation, a 
surrogate would be able to direct removal of a feeding tube for a 
person in a vegetative state.254  Furthermore, given that the majority 
of doctors believe it is appropriate to remove feeding tubes for 
patients in vegetative states255 and the possibility of “doctor 
shopping” by the guardian, there is little doubt that Terri Schiavo’s 
fate would not have changed under the AHCDA. 
D. Sun Hudson 
If the Quinlan, Cruzan, and Schiavo cases look remarkably 
similar from a factual viewpoint, the sad case of Sun Hudson is 
quite different.256  Sun was born with a genetic condition called 
thanatophoric dysplasia, a form of dwarfism, which includes a 
narrow chest, small ribs, and underdeveloped lungs.257  Infants born 
with this condition, if they are not stillborn, usually die shortly after 
birth from respiratory failure.258  This condition normally restricts 
the growth of the rib cage so that the baby slowly suffocates.259  
Texas Children’s Hospital, where Sun was born, placed him on a 
ventilator, but informed his mother that further treatment would 
be futile, merely prolonging the inevitable, and that in their view he 
should be removed from the ventilator.260  His mother refused, and 
the matter ended up in probate court, where the judge eventually 
ruled that five-month old Sun could be taken off life support, 
 
 253. Sensation is defined as the activity of the sensors, or the immediate result 
of this activity before the combination with other data.  THE NEW LEXICON 
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION 
907 (1989). 
 254. See Keiner v. Cmty. Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292, 298 (Ill. 1998) 
(stating in part that a patient in a persistent vegetative state is unable to purposely 
interact with stimulation from his environment). 
 255. Payne, supra note 84, at 107, Table 4. 
 256. Associated Press, Infant Born with Fatal Defect Dies After Being Taken 
Off Life Support, ABC13.NET, Mar. 15, 2005, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/news/ 
031405_local_baby1.html; Associated Press, Houston Mother Loses Fight to Keep 
Baby on Life Support, NBC5.COM, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.nbc5.com/ 
health/428633/detail.html; Rick Casey, No Villains in This Sad Story, 
HOUSTONCHRONICLE.COM, Feb. 23, 2005, http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ 
ssistory.mpl/metropolitan/casey/3047420. 
 257. Infant Born with Fatal Defect Dies After Being Taken Off Life Support, 
supra note 257. 
 258. Rick Casey, supra note 256. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Houston Mother Loses Fight to Keep Baby on Life Support, supra note 
256. 
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despite his mother’s objections.261  Under Texas law, the mother 
was allowed ten days to find another hospital willing to take over 
care.262  When the mother was unable to find another hospital, Sun 
was removed from the ventilator, and he died a few breaths later, 
on March 15, 2005.263 
The AHCDA applies only to adults,264 so under Alaska law, 
Sun’s mother would act on her baby’s behalf under general 
parental rights rather than as a surrogate.265  Nonetheless, the 
hospital could have determined that keeping Sun on a respirator 
would constitute “medically ineffective health care,” which is care 
that “cannot cure the illness, cannot diminish its progressive course, 
and cannot effectively alleviate severe discomfort and distress.”266  
This would have been a questionable determination, however, 
because the respirator diminished the progressive course of the 
malady by prolonging Sun’s life. 
Another way in which the Alaska and Texas procedures 
diverge is that under Alaska law, if the mother chose to seek a 
transfer, the hospital would have had to provide continuing care 
until the transfer was effected.267  By contrast, there is a ten-day 
time limit under Texas law.268  In Alaska, the search for a hospital 
willing to take the child could go on indefinitely. 
Alternatively, the hospital could have turned to section 
13.52.140, under which it could have requested the superior court 
to direct a healthcare decision.  At that point, the court has the 
dilemma noted earlier: should it review the surrogate’s decision 
under the standards provided in the AHCDA or under the 
standards provided in the guardianship act?  The judicial relief 
section of the AHCDA appears to direct the court to the 
guardianship act.269  However, another question arises as to whether 
to consult the section on guardians of minors or guardians of 
incapacitated persons.  The statute does not provide guidance 
 
 261. Casey, supra note 256. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Infant Born with Fatal Defect Dies After Being Taken Off Life Support, 
supra note 256. 
 264.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645 (1972); Evans v. Taggart, 88 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2004). 
 265. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(a) (2004). 
 266. § 13.52.060(f). 
 267. § 13.52.060(g)(2). 
 268. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(e) (Vernon 2002). 
 269. The AHCDA states that “[a] proceeding under this section is governed by 
AS 13.26.165–13.26.320.”  § 13.52.140.  These sections are a part of the 
guardianship statutes. 
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because it mistakenly directs that the statute on conservatorships 
be used.270  Understandably, the statute on minor guardianships 
does not address termination of life support beyond generally 
authorizing the guardian to facilitate medical care and treatment.271  
The article regarding incapacitated persons, which does address 
termination issues, is not limited to adults and can apply to any 
incapacitated person.272  If the court turns to this article, it may hold 
that a guardian can consent to withholding life-saving medical 
procedures, as long as those procedures serve only to prolong the 
dying process, under section 13.26.150(e)(3).  However, nothing in 
the guardianship statutes suggests that the judge may order the 
withholding of life-sustaining procedures if the guardian does not 
want them withheld. 
On the other hand, if the judge interprets the section of the 
AHCDA which states that “[a] proceeding under this section is 
governed by” the guardianship statutes as merely referring to the 
procedure, then it would look to the AHCDA for the standards to 
be applied in determining whether life support should be 
terminated.  However this is a stretch, not only because section 
13.52.140 does not refer to procedure, but rather a proceeding, and 
the AHCDA does not appear to contemplate that the decisions be 
made by a judge.273  If a judge heard a case similar to that of baby 
Sun’s, the judge would have to determine whether the condition is 
“incurable or irreversible,” whether “without administration of life-
sustaining procedures death would result in a short period of time,” 
whether “there is no reasonable prospect of cure or recovery,” and 
whether “the condition imposes severe pain or an inhumane 
burden on the patient.”274  Assuming the other conditions were met, 
the court might nonetheless have a difficult time finding that there 
would be an “inhumane burden” on the baby, who was apparently 
not in any particular pain and breathing reasonably well on the 
ventilator. 
Assuming the judge would not find an inhumane burden, this 
would have left the hospital with one remaining alternative: it could 
petition the court to appoint someone other than the mother as the 
 
 270. Section 13.52.140 points to sections 13.26.165-.320, part of the guardianship 
statutes covering conservatorships. 
 271. § 13.26.070(3). 
 272. § 13.26.090. 
 273. See § 13.52.030(a). 
 274. This is the definition of a “terminal condition” under section 13.52.390(42).  
Life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn from a patient with a 
“qualifying condition.”  § 13.52.045.  The definition of “qualifying condition” 
includes a “terminal condition.”  § 13.52.390(36). 
110805 03_KIRK.DOC 1/3/2006  4:50 PM 
248 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:2 
child’s guardian, hoping that the appointee would be more likely to 
agree with its position.  However, section 13.26.045 allows 
appointment of a guardian for a minor only if all parental rights of 
custody have been terminated or suspended by circumstances or a 
prior court order.  None of those conditions occurred in this case.  
Therefore, regardless of the hospital’s position, it is likely Sun 
Hudson would have lived a little while longer under the AHCDA. 
E. Ora Mae Magouirk 
In April 2005, at the height of the Schiavo controversy, one of 
the hot topics of discussion on the Internet was the unusual case of 
a widow who was allegedly being starved to death in a hospice.  
Unlike the previous cases, it is not possible to conclusively state the 
facts of this case.275  However, for purposes of this Article, 
ascertaining the precise facts from among the multiple versions is 
unnecessary.  Therefore, the following version has been pieced 
together by combining the various sources, with no representation 
of accuracy. 
Ora Mae Magouirk was an eighty-one year old woman living 
in Alabama.  Because she was a widow without any surviving 
children, her granddaughter helped take care of her by running 
errands and bringing her food.  The granddaughter also had a 
general power of attorney.  Magouirk had a living will, which said 
 
 275. Only a few articles appeared in the mainstream press, none of which were 
able to determine which side of the controversy gave the most accurate facts.  
Most of the information available on the case comes from Internet news sources 
that have a particular philosophical perspective and whose information, therefore, 
is necessarily suspect.  See, e.g., Sarah Foster, Closest Kin Prevented from Visiting 
‘Grandma,’ WORLDNETDAILY.COM, Apr. 12, 2005, 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=43763; Sarah 
Foster, Granddaughter Yanks Grandma’s Feeding Tube, WORLDNETDAILY.COM, 
Apr. 7, 2005, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID 
=43688; Mark A. R. Kleiman, Mae Magouirk: Is There a Reporter in the House?, 
MARK A. R. KLEINMAN: A WEBLOG FOR THE REALITY-BASED COMMUNITY, Apr. 
8, 2005,  http://www.markarkleiman.com/archives/_/2005/04/mae_magouirk_is_ 
there_a_reporter_in_the_house.php; Mark A. R. Kleiman, Magouirk Update, 
MARK A. R. KLEINMAN: A WEBLOG FOR THE REALITY-BASED COMMUNITY, Apr. 
11, 2005,  http://www.markarkleiman.com/archives/schiavo_/2005/04/magouirk 
_update.php; Denis O’Hayer, Georgia Case Mirrors Schiavo Battle, 11 
ALIVE.COM, Apr. 8, 2005,  http://www.11alive.com/help/search/search_article 
.aspx?storyid=61478; Charles Yoo, Illness Splits Woman’s Kin, THE ATLANTA 
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.ajc.com/hp/content/metro/ 
0405/12illness.html; Maria Vitale Gallagher, Woman’s Starvation Stopped in a 
Terri Schiavo-Like Situation, LIFENEWS.COM, Apr. 11, 2005, 
http://www.lifenews.com/bio905.html. 
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that nutrition and hydration were to be withheld only if she were 
either comatose or in a vegetative state.  In March 2005, Magouirk 
was hospitalized for an aortic problem, reportedly lucid at the time.  
The granddaughter had her transferred to a hospice, telling other 
relatives they should let her pass away, and apparently not telling 
the hospice about the living will.  Magouirk was only able to eat 
foods such as Jell-O and chips of ice.  On learning of this, 
Magouirk’s sister and brother insisted on placement of a feeding 
tube, and made arrangements for Magouirk to be transported to 
the hospital at the University of Alabama at Birmingham to begin 
the procedure.  However, while they were at the hospice awaiting 
her transport to the hospital, the granddaughter went to court and 
obtained an emergency order appointing herself as guardian; she 
again refused to have the feeding tube inserted.  A few days later, 
after hearing from Magouirk’s siblings, the probate judge ordered 
that she be “adequately fed” pending a determination of her 
condition, which was to be based on the opinion of three mutually 
agreed-upon neurologists.  There is no available record of the final 
decision. Magouirk reportedly died a few months later at a 
relative’s home. 
Perhaps the first and foremost lesson one can learn from the 
Magouirk case is that having an advance directive is useless if one’s 
medical providers are unaware of it.  In Alaska, most of the major 
hospitals have now set up directories that will store copies of 
advance directives for those who provide one.276  In addition, 
declarants should provide a copy to any physician they see on a 
regular basis and any surgeon or specialist who may be treating 
them for a particular problem (and to the declarant’s lawyer, of 
course). 
In the Magouirk case, the granddaughter’s power of attorney 
did not include medical decision-making, and the living will 
apparently did not include appointment of an agent for health-care 
decisions.  Therefore, under the AHCDA, the hospice would have 
referred to section 13.52.030, the section on surrogates.  The 
sources reflect conflicting information on Magouirk’s ability to 
express herself at the time she arrived at the hospice.  However, if 
she had been able to express an opinion, she could have designated 
a surrogate and informed her healthcare providers of her choice.  
Assuming that she could not express an opinion, the healthcare 
providers would have looked to the priority list to see who should 
 
 276. Confirmed by phone calls by author’s staff to major hospitals in Alaska.  
Telephone interviews by author’s staff with Providence Hospital, Alaska Regional 
Hospital, and Alaska Native Medical (July 19-22, 2005). 
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make decisions on her behalf.277  Magouirk did not have a surviving 
spouse, adult child, or parent, but the fourth priority is an adult 
sibling.  Magouirk had two adult siblings.  Either her sister or 
brother could have stepped forward and claimed the position of 
surrogate, or they could have both done so and would have had to 
reach consensus.278  Had they both stepped forward and not been 
able to agree on decisions, the doctor would have broken the tie.279  
Either way, the sister and brother were both inclined to have a 
feeding tube inserted, and there is no reason to think that doing so 
would have been so far outside generally accepted healthcare 
standards that the provider would have been entitled to refuse.  
Presumably, the tube would have been inserted. 
Could the granddaughter nonetheless have gone to probate 
court and received an emergency guardianship order?  After all, a 
surrogate may make decisions only if a guardian has not been 
appointed,280 and while an agent may, in certain circumstances, be 
able to overrule a guardian,281 there is nothing in the AHCDA that 
suggests that a surrogate can overrule a guardian.  The 
granddaughter could have applied for temporary guardianship 
under section 13.26.140, and if she convinced the court that an 
emergency order was necessary to protect the respondent from 
serious injury, illness, or disease, she could have obtained it.282  The 
maneuver may or may not have worked.  The granddaughter would 
have had to file a petition that provides the names and addresses of 
“the individuals most closely related to the respondent by blood or 
marriage.”283  This would have required her to provide the names of 
the brother and sister and take the risk that the court would contact 
them and learn that they were opposed to her guardianship. 
The guardianship statutes also have a priority list, which is 
similar to, but not identical to, the list in the AHCDA.284  One of 
the differences between the two lists could be absolutely critical in 
this case: the surrogate list begins with a spouse, then an adult 
child, then a parent, then an adult sibling, and finally an adult who 
has exhibited special care and concern for the patient.285  The 
 
 277. § 13.52.030(c). 
 278. See § 13.52.030(f). 
 279. See id. 
 280. See § 13.52.030(a). 
 281. § 13.52.040(b). 
 282. See § 13.26.140(d). 
 283. See § 13.26.105(b)(6). 
 284. The guardianship priority list is at section 13.26.145(d); the surrogate 
preference list is at section 13.52.030(c). 
 285. § 13.52.030(c). 
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guardianship list begins with the spouse, then an adult child or 
parent, then a relative with whom the incapacitated person has 
resided for more than six months, then a relative or friend who has 
demonstrated a sincere longstanding interest in the welfare of the 
incapacitated person.286  As adult siblings, the brother and sister 
would have had priority over the granddaughter for appointment as 
surrogates, but for guardianship appointment, the siblings would 
have been on the same priority level as relatives who had 
demonstrated a sincere, longstanding interest in the welfare of the 
incapacitated person.  In fact, the granddaughter might have been 
considered higher on the list than the siblings, because while she 
was not actually living with Magouirk, she had apparently been 
helping to provide for her for some time. 
Regardless of who was appointed as guardian (if the probate 
court even found a necessity for guardianship given the availability 
of a surrogate), the court would have still had the authority to 
review and amend a decision of the guardian287 and, therefore, 
could have directed the insertion or withholding of the feeding 
tube.  The court would have considered whether the procedures in 
question would “serve only to prolong the dying process and offer 
no reasonable expectation of effecting a temporary or permanent 
cure of, or relief from, the illness or condition being treated . . . .”288  
While Magouirk was elderly and had a potentially dangerous aortic 
condition, the information at hand suggests that she was not 
terminal, and, therefore, would probably not have qualified for 
cessation of life-sustaining treatment. She was also not in a 
vegetative state, so she would have experienced severe discomfort 
from being given inadequate nutrition and hydration, which would 
have unquestionably factored into a judge’s decision. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the spring of 2005, the news of the moment was the death of 
Terri Schiavo by dehydration. Congress passed legislation to stop 
this action in a late-night session,289 and numerous writs, cases, and 
appeals were filed.  In the end, judicial authority won out over 
congressional dissent.  Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube was disconnected 
and she slowly died.  In the meantime, the media and the internet 
buzzed with stories about a deformed baby in Houston and an 
 
 286. § 13.26.145(d). 
 287. See § 13.26.125(a)(1). 
 288. See § 13.26.150(e)(3). 
 289. Terry Schiavo Law, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
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elderly woman in a hospice in Georgia.  End-of-life decisions were 
the water-cooler topic of the season. 
The majority public sentiment seems to have been that Ms. 
Schiavo should not have been “starved to death,”290 an observation 
supported by the legislative response. In the U.S. House of 
Representatives, where the vote was recorded, 203 representatives 
voted in favor of the bill to provide her with specific relief and only 
58 representatives voted against the bill.291  The U.S. Senate passed 
the same bill on a voice vote, and the President promptly signed it.  
Based on the overwhelming legislative response, one could assume 
that the majority of Americans seem to be opposed to removal of a 
feeding tube from a patient in a minimally conscious or vegetative 
state. 
Nonetheless, in Alaska,292 the recently passed AHCDA would, 
in all likelihood, have resulted in Terri Schiavo’s death by 
dehydration, just as it actually happened in Florida.  Despite the 
fact that the AHCDA says that it establishes a presumption in 
favor of life,293 the specifics and the legislative history allow plenty 
of leeway to terminate life support, including removal of a feeding 
tube in circumstances in which most people believe it would be 
wrong to do so.294 
The AHCDA needs to be revisited, regardless of the 
philosophical position from which one approaches these issues.  
For example, the misdirection in section 13.52.140, in which the 
reader is referred to the conservatorship statutes instead of the 
guardianship statutes; the dichotomy between what the form 
suggests about the right to direct that life support be terminated 
even if one is pregnant295 and the statute that does not allow it;296 
 
 290. Ninette Sosa, et al., Schiavo’s Feeding Tube Removed, CNN.com, Mar. 18, 
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/18/schiavo.brain-damaged/. 
 291. 151 CONG. REC. H1728 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005). One hundred seventy-
four representatives did not vote.  Id. 
 292. At present, the Senate is Republican-controlled by a margin of twelve to 
eight, and the House of Representatives by twenty-six to fourteen.  
Committee/Member Information of the Alaska State Legislature, 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/commbr_info.asp? session=24 (last visited Sept. 
26, 2005).  The Governor is Republican as well.  Republican Governors 
Association, http://www.rga.org/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). 
 293. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.120(a) (2004). 
 294. See supra notes 152–55 and accompanying text. 
 295. The sample Advance Health Directive given in the statutes has a section 
that seems to allow a person to enter end-of-life directives in case that person is 
unconscious and pregnant.  § 13.52.300, pt. 2, item (6)(E). 
 296. § 13.52.055(b). 
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and the possible misconception as to what “legally separated” 
means in the context of a spouse taking control as a surrogate,297 all 
need to be clarified. 
When it addresses these technical concerns, the legislature 
should also consider whether the actual effect of the AHCDA will 
accomplish its purpose.  The AHCDA purports to be based on the 
right to self-determination, combined with a concern for the 
sanctity of life.298  Instead, it has been infused with enough 
loopholes such that doctors and surrogates can terminate lives, 
even of the unwilling, based on their own philosophical convictions.  
Although many people espouse the philosophy that those who 
cannot lead a productive life are “better off dead,” this is not the 
philosophy the legislature appears to have endorsed, at least 
explicitly, when it passed the AHCDA.299  If the legislature did not 
intend this result, it should consider a number of changes to the 
AHCDA, including a re-examination of whether the definition of 
“permanent unconsciousness” should include those in a vegetative 
state. 
 
 297. § 13.52.030(c)(1). 
 298. See § 13.52.010. 
 299. See id. 
